Introduction
The expansion of retail TNCs and their role as 'market makers' (Hamilton et al., 2011) over the past decade has become an increasingly important topic, not only within business/management studies but also across the wider social sciences including economic geography, development studies, agricultural economics and sociology (Coe and Wrigley, 2009; Dawson et al., 2006) . While these literatures have sometimes been accused of talking past rather than deeply engaging each other (cf. Coe and Wrigley, 2006; Palmer et al., 2006) , they have contributed to an increasingly rich understanding of the strategic approaches and wider spatial & developmental effects of international retail expansion. Key aspects of these processes have included the manner in which emerging markets have attracted retail Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through regulatory liberalisation and how the entry of multinational retailers into those previously insulated markets has generated significant host economy impacts (Coe and Wrigley, 2007; Wood and Reynolds, 2012b) . The degree to (and manner by which) these trends have affected countries varies significantly and is governed by the extent and timing of market liberalisation, the pre-existing political and business environment, as well as the presence of domestic retailers with sufficient market scale to respond successfully to the competitive threat of new entrants. This paper seeks to contribute to these evolving research streams by analysing the emergence of Vietnam as a destination for retail TNC investment and retail modernisation. More specifically, the research aims to compare and contrast the experience of Vietnam to the phases of diffusion of western 'developed' forms of retailing outlined and debated across the social sciences (Dries et al., 2004; Humphrey, 2007; , and to comparable experiences of other countries emerging from previously state controlled economies into periods of post-socialist governance and regulation. This is particularly worthy of exploration given the well-known firmlevel challenges for retail TNCs in achieving acceptance for their western retail formats in new markets while also negotiating wider issues related to the regulations governing FDI (Alexander and Doherty, 2009 ). The paper achieves its aim by drawing on a wide range of government and industry secondary data -much of which has not entered western academic debate given the challenges of access and translation.
Waves of supermarket emergence in developing countries and post-communist transformation

Conceptualising the retail revolution
The acceleration of retail FDI since the mid-1990s has been principally driven by the leading European and US-based retailers (mostly grocery/general merchandise operators), typically exporting capital, store formats and management, marketing and operational competencies to the emerging economies of East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Such developments contrast with the more limited (and often less successful) western-to-western developed-market retail FDI typified by Walmart's entry into Germany and the UK, and Tesco's entry into the USA (Fernie and Arnold, 2002; Lowe and Wrigley, 2010; Pioch et al., 2009 ).
In general, the surge of Western retail FDI into developing economies which characterised the late 1990s was stimulated by the longer-term growth opportunities that emerging markets offered in terms of exploiting and upgrading traditional retail systems (Dawson et al., 2006) . During the late 1990s
and early 2000s such economies increasingly experienced full or partial liberalisation of trade and market access, together with robust economic/income growth and urban infrastructure development.
As a result, they offered attractive destinations for investment. As Wrigley (2000, p 306 ) put it at the time, the largest of these firms had the ability 'to leverage their increasing core-market scale and free cash flow for expansionary investment ... in order to secure the longer-term higher growth opportunities offered by the emerging markets'. In turn, this was strengthened by the 'regulatory push' from many home markets that were nearing saturation, something related to competition and land-use planning regulation (Wood et al., 2010) . The leading operators quickly developed first mover advantages in key emerging markets, further strengthened with codified and transferable sets of operational, sourcing and marketing competences. That is to say, knowledge that could be applied to new markets to help realise a balance between standardised operational efficiency and local embedded sensitivity (Aoyoma, 2007; Bianchi and Ostale, 2006; Coe and Lee, 2006; Currah and Wrigley, 2004; Wood and Reynolds, 2012a) . Indeed, the retail marketing literature has explored the challenges of winning consumer acceptance for new formats in under-developed retail markets.
For example, research has noted the persistent strength of traditional wet markets within Asian countries in the face of western 'modern' retail formats (Goldman and Krider, 1999; Goldman et al., 2002 ) while other studies have explored consumer resistance to "foreign" operators (Amine and Tanfous, 2012; El-Amir and Burt, 2008) and the need to adjust merchandise and marketing communications accordingly (Burt et al., 2011) . Consequently, international expansion is often related to failure and divestment as much as to successful, profitable revenue streams (Alexander et al., 2005; Cairns et al., 2008; Palmer and Quinn, 2007) .
The diffusion of retail FDI within the food retail sector over the past twenty years has been conceptualised in the work of Reardon as a series of 'waves' of supermarket emergence. Such diffusion is detailed in Table 1 and has some distinct characteristics. Table 1 Reardon's 'first wave' is seen as having impacted countries in South America, northern-Central Europe, and East Asia outside of Japan and China, during the early 1990s and typically involved initial small-scale forays into 'modern' retailing by local firms which used domestic capital to emulate retail formats and practices they had observed in North America and Western Europe. Some of these markets also experienced entry, involving relatively modest levels of retail FDI, by 'first mover' international retailers such as Carrefour and Makro that were rewarded by 'super-normal' returns on their investments. His 'second' and 'third waves' then saw the beginnings of the transformation of 'traditional' retail structures in Mexico, parts of Central America, much of SouthEast Asia and south-Central Europe during the late 1990s, followed by China, Eastern Europe, other parts of Central America and South-East Asia (e.g. Vietnam) in the early 2000s. These waves were powered by the acceleration in retail FDI and, particularly during the late 1990s, involved many of the fledgling retail TNCs in a 'gold rush' period of entry into emerging markets. Occasionally this consisted of little more than 'flag planting' but more often was followed by substantial ongoing capital investment. However, some markets (e.g. South Africa) were either neglected by the retail TNCs (Okeahalam and Wood, 2009) , or effectively closed to retail FDI by regulatory policy (e.g. India) and, as a result, began to be transformed during these waves largely by indigenous firms and domestic capital (Mutebi, 2007) . Finally, Reardon has recognized a 'fourth wave' which is viewed as having begun in the late 2000s and involves the transformation of retail structures in poorer countries in South Asia (outside India), South East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa Within the individual countries impacted by these waves, diffusion trends of both 'modern' retail in general, and the store networks of the retail TNCs in particular, have been discussed in the research literature. In summary, within individual emerging markets (as Figure 1 attempts to convey in the context of South East Asia), retail FDI in the late 1990s -often facilitated by liberalisation of market access − typically rapidly accelerated any existing retail 'modernisation' trends which existed. It also changed the existing 'rules of the game' as a result of the import of practices and organizational innovations (new formats, supply chain/distribution-logistic system reorganization, enhanced customer service and quality assurance standards, etc). In consequence, via both the direct operations of the retail TNCs and the imitative competitive responses of indigenous retail chains, this led to expansion, consolidation and multi-nationalisation of the 'modern' retail sector in those countries, together with a progressive squeezing of traditional/informal retail channels.
Take in
Take in Figure 1 Conceptual frameworks for retail TNC expansion within former state controlled emerging markets
In terms of the consequences of retail FDI entry and proliferation, it is important not to regard all emerging economies as homogenous. A critical difference that affects the structural conditions within a country and the subsequent emergence of the retail market is the system of economic organisation prior to market liberalisation (Smith et al., 2008) . Reardon and Swinnen (2004) differentiate between former state-controlled economies (FSCEs) and non-FSCEs. As can be seen from Figure 2 , most East/Southeast Asia countries that liberalised retail FDI in the late 1990s tended to be non FSCEs, while FSCEs liberalised regulation relatively later and therefore formed part of the later waves of retail FDI expansion. Take in Figure 2 In any particular FSCE, Dries et al (2004) suggest that the retail revolution tended to involve three different phases: 'pre-transition/communist', 'transition' and 'globalization' (see Table 2 ), with the speed and starting dates differing from one FSCE to another. In all cases however, the 'pre-transition' stage involved the state playing an important role in the retail sector, combined, in some countries, with a significant parallel retail sector that was private, informal, and small-scale. The second ('transition') stage which followed, then usually involved ownership change via privatisation but without fundamental change in the distribution (concentration of ownership or location pattern) and format (small versus large) of retail outlets. Finally, the third stage -the 'globalisation period' -was fuelled by major investment by retail TNCs. In this stage, supermarkets emerged rapidly relative to their earlier development, with a proliferation of formats (large format stores, including hypermarkets, discount stores, and cash & carry, as well as small-format convenience chain stores), in addition to deep changes in their procurement systems. Some countries entered the globalisation stage as early as the mid-1990s, while others did not do so until the early 2000s -a characteristic in particular of Reardon's third-wave countries.
Take in Table 2 FSCEs shared overall pre-reform institutional similarities, such as state ownership of property, planning and the one-party rule. However, state-socialism was more complete, in terms of institutional scope and depth, in some countries than in others (Pei, 1996) . As a result, in order to explore the retail revolution in the context of Vietnam, it is necessary to look first at frameworks suggested for other FSCEs.
Most of these frameworks begin by noting the important differences between FSCE and non-FSCE countries (see Table 3 ). First, FSCEs have tended to be slower in liberalising regulations relating to FDI but have exhibited greater tendency to regulate wetmarkets than non-FSCEs. For example, within China there is the 'farmer's markets into supermarkets' programme that is an explicit policy within main cities of integrating (through auction) wetmarkets into supermarket chains.
Second, rates of supermarket growth in FSCE countries have been significantly higher than rates in non-FSCE countries -due to the fact that they had already moved partially along the route of a shift from traditional, informal retail system to state-managed retail chains .
Third, quite unlike most of the non-FSCE countries, the residual state presence in the markets in FSCE countries manifested itself as direct state investment (also indirect measures such as cheap credit) in supermarket chains. The residual state presence might explain why there tends to be greater presence of several strong domestic chains in the supermarket sector in FSCEs, despite the increasing trend of retail multi-nationalisation and consolidation.
Finally, most of the transition countries are on the way to close relationships with a developed country group or association, such as accession bilateral relationships with the European Union (EU) or World Trade Organisation (WTO) that have facilitated rapid competitive investments by retailers in these countries to occupy strategic positions in the under-developed market. Table 3 Previous research on retail change in Vietnam
Research focusing on retail transformation within Vietnam has slowly emerged since the pioneering work of Venard (1996) who described the 'pre-transition' structures of the country's wholesaling and retailing systems. Since then, both Hagen (2002) and Figuié and Moustier (2009) have made important contributions by assessing the consequences of supermarket development in Vietnam − with the former focusing to a large extent on food retailing innovation, and the latter analysing the risks and benefits that accompanied the supermarket revolution from the perspective of poor urban consumers. Similarly, Jensen and Peppard (2003; in a study of food buying habits in Hanoi have focused specifically on the fate of the street vendor, whilst Yang et al. (2011) have assessed the competitiveness of foreign and domestic supermarket chains and argued that smaller Vietnamese retailers remained surprisingly competitive, partly due to the preference of many consumers for convenience and purchasing food close to their home. More comprehensively, Trung (2007, 2008; 2011) have discussed the operation and evolution of domestic modern retailers, the structure and background of multinational competitors, and the transformation of Vietnamese consumers' shopping habits.
In the following sections, we employ the frameworks described in this review of retail change in developing markets to conceptualise the market adaptation and retail modernisation process within Vietnam. We achieve this through the use of close interrogation of secondary data (legal dictates, analyst reports, the retail press) as well as through store visits.
Modern food retail development in Vietnam
Vietnam is a 'third-wave' and 'transition' country and 'often compared by experts to China of the Nineties' (Global Retail Newsletter, 2009: 1a) . It remains a mixture of socialist and free-market regimes since a resolution adopted by Sixth Party Congress in 1986 that committed the country to pursue a socialist-oriented market economy. As CNN put it 'With a curious combination of communism and capitalism, business in this Southeast Asian nation switches between the two all the time' (CNN World Business, 2005). As a result, Vietnam has characteristics of both transition economies and free-market economies elsewhere in South-East Asia and its retail system transformation bears some similarities to the cases within Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and China.
Based on the path of change in the retail sector of the CEE region formulated by Dries et al. (2004) and the model of a developing country with a free-market regime in the framework of Natawidjaja et al. (2007) In analysing the emergence of retail systems from a CEE country perspective, Dries et al. (2004) distinguish between the 'centralised/state' model and the 'decentralised/state-private mixed' approach. The former is characteristic of Vietnam at this time which saw retail and wholesale entities (mainly state-owned or co-operatives) organised as spatial monopolies, with little or no competition between them, as privately owned companies played only a minor role. Most food sales took place in state enterprises where shops were either broad-line food shops or fresh fruit/vegetable stores. In addition to the state enterprises, an important share of food distribution was channelled through consumer co-operative and state-owned department stores. In contrast, the latter 'decentralised/stateprivate mixed' approach saw state-owned chains of small format stores based in the various regions selling mainly dry/processed products with only very small sections of FFV [Fresh Fruit and Vegetables] . Private small shops therefore operated in a parallel retail market (Dries et al, 2004) .
Pre-1954, the commercial system in the North of Vietnam included thousands of small shops and small-and-medium-sized capitalist enterprises. In 1954, after the liberation of the North, the government established new state-owned enterprises and transformed the private shops and enterprises into either state and private collective-named companies or trading co-operatives. By 1960, most of commercial enterprises had changed their ownership and over 150,000 private-owned shops had become elements of either trading co-operatives or production co-operatives. A similar process occurred in the South of Vietnam after unification in 1975 (Le, 2012) .
For over 30 years , the commercial activities within Vietnam were in theory monopolised by the state with the private sector effectively illegal, though, as Venard (1996, p 30) notes, 'existence of a private sector has nonetheless always been tolerated to balance deficiencies of the centralized system' (see also Fforde, 1993) . The government ordered that all trade and business activities of 'bourgeois' tradesmen be abolished; only small merchants retailing goods uncontrolled by the State could exist (Charles and Hoa, 1996) .
In the South the private sector retail had flourished, with supermarkets emerging in the late 1960s mainly in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City -henceforth referred to as HCMC) and operating until the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975, when US forces withdrew from Southern Vietnam.
Subsequently, these self-service supermarkets were transformed into counter-service state-run operations (Truong and Nguyen, 2007) . Take in Figure 4 Overall, this early stage of transition saw the gradual effects of structural adjustment on the retail market -a phase characterised by a privatisation process mainly initiated by domestic capital. In the CEE context, Dries et al (2004) have argued that such a period was marked by a breakdown of the highly concentrated state system into separate units that soon start to merge and form small, private retail chains.
The rate of expansion of supermarkets within Vietnam was modest over this period, reaching just under 20 at its close. With the exception of state-owned Intimex, private or joint venture companies (95%) owned most of the supermarkets and convenience stores opened during this time (see Table   4 ). Initial experiments with modern retail formats met with mixed success. In October 1993, Minimart, the first supermarket in Vietnam since 1975, was opened by a state-owned enterprise (Vung Tau Agricultural Products and Handicrafts Import-Export Company). It offered a modest sales area and was located in HCMC . However, it closed 4 days after opening because of insufficient stock levels to meet the enormous demand, despite prices being 20-30% more than those of traditional retailers (Venard, 1996 Take in Table 4 here By 1996, some larger-sized supermarkets (3,000-4,000m 2 ) offering 5,000-6,000 SKUs began to appear in HCMC the development of modern retail sector in the early 1990s was mainly fostered by domestic capital because FDI inflows were limited during that period. Foreign investors encountered obstacles to entering the market due to unclear ownership structures, a ban on participation in privatisation auctions, unclear privatisation of state enterprises, unstable macroeconomic situations, and in some cases civil strife and political instability.
In Vietnam, change accelerated in 1994 with the lifting of the 30-year-American embargo and establishment of diplomatic links with the United States, which were indicative of the newly 'opened' economy during that period. As Venard (1996) We discuss each of these characteristics in relation to Vietnam:
(i) The rise of the modern retail sector
Research within CEE countries underlines the rapid rate of modernisation of the retail sector with the onset of this third phase of development (Dries et al., 2004) . In the context of Vietnam, a number of indicators illustrate these trends, notably the growth of (and share of sales through) modern stores in the food market. However, it is essential to note that the retail food sector in Vietnam has remained dominated by traditional/wet markets and 'mom and pop' stores (see Figure 5 ).
Take in Figure 5 The number of modern outlets continuously increased from a low base during the period 2002-07, and then 'took off' after WTO accession -albeit remaining under-developed compared to other countries in East Asia. Nevertheless, growth was accompanied by an increasing diversification into modern formats -not only supermarkets and convenience stores, but also mini-marts, hypermarkets, large wholesale stores and department stores. In particular, the expansion in Stage 4, immediately following Vietnam's accession to the WTO, is notable for the increase in the proliferation of modern formats (see Table 5 ).
Take in Table 5 Official statistics concerning supermarket expansion are beset by definitional confusion. Take in Table 6 & Table 7 Correspondingly, the share of the modern retail sector soared from around 1% in the early 2000s to around 16% in 2009, with an average growth rate of 25% per year (see Table 7 ). However, the share of trade in under-developed retail channels remains dominant, with considerable opportunity for international and domestic operators to expand superstore/supermarket formats and to adapt customer preferences accordingly. Of course, such a step change in customer behaviours is a process fraught with risk and requires a close understanding of the consumer (Goldman and Krider, 1999; Goldman et al., 2002; Humphrey, 2007) .
(ii) Multi-nationalisation and modes of market entry
The pace of multi-nationalisation in Vietnam was not as rapid as evident across the CEE region. The number of foreign retailers increased from 2 in 1998 to 8 by 2010, though the store count remained modest (See for example Table 8 for details of the leading grocery retailers).
Take in Table 8 During The joint venture approach to market entry is well-known to provide essential knowledge concerning customers, regulations and contacts (Owens et al., 2013) , especially within 'particularistic' business environments and may also be a pre-requisite for FDI to occur within some countries that restrict foreign ownership shares of assets (Wrigley et al., 2005) . We identify three kinds of joint venture within Vietnam: official joint venture, unofficial joint venture, and renting joint venture.
First, the official joint venture was established by overseas retailers formally contributing capital to set up a third company with a local partner. This approach has worked well, not only the cases of Big C (Cora) and Seiyu supermarkets in the 'transitional' stage, but also in the 'globalisation' stage, when the JV approach became less of a pre-requisite for market entry, with the likes of Lottemart, Circle K, Big C, SPAR and Familymart employing the strategy. However, such arrangements often led to relations with numerous local partners and at times led to rather convoluted forms of ownership that are clear from one example in the emergence of Vindemia's partners (see Figure 6 ). Figure 6 Second, operators within Vietnam may have pursued unofficial joint ventures. Given the unregulated nature of such developments, precise details are difficult to obtain -however, our research has suggested that some retailers strategically rented areas in trade centres owned by domestic companies and opened outlets without receiving the official permission of the relevant authority. In the case of the Big C store in the Go Vap District of HCMC, the authorities confirmed that they would not provide a licence for a 100%-owned foreign company. Consequently, a Big C unit was developed in all but name as the store was covered by the name of the trade centre owned by a local enterprise (Tuoitreonline, 2008) . SKUs, of which 90% were domestic (Dairy Farm, 2011; Tin247.com, 2007) . Such a strategy provided an essential foothold within the market prior to regulatory relaxation that will enable the retailer to develop its own Wellcome brand and leverage its competencies in the market (see Table 9 for the staged approach to expansion). However, by the end of 2010, the retailer still only operated three supermarkets under the Wellcome banner. The case of Metro Group is also notable given its approach to entering the market via a 100% owned 'cash & carry' operation that nominally required customers to be wholesale purchasers. However, this investment did not have the right to import directly into Vietnam (GAIN, 2005) .
Take in
Take in Table 9 In order to protect domestically owned supermarkets, the government of Vietnam did not historically encourage 100% foreign-owned investment in the retail industry. However, the regulations of foreign and domestic enterprises were significantly modified after July 1 suggests that in numerous instances such regulations were flouted with shares well in excess of the permitted levels (see Table 10 ).
Take in Table 10 (iii) Intra-country supermarket diffusion and concentration in the supermarket sector A wide array of the research literature concerning supermarket diffusion has suggested an initial focus of retail TNCs in establishing stores within key cities and major urban strategic locations on market entry and then a gradual diffusion out to secondary cities and small towns, along with an increasing focus on lower income consumers and markets (Dries et al., 2004; Reardon and Hopkins, 2006; . The experience of Vietnam appears to broadly mirror these trends. Most supermarkets and convenience stores set up in the transitional stage were located within the big cities (Hanoi, HCMC), except for the case of Cora Hypermarket (Vindemia) which entered a secondary city (Bien Hoa city). Indeed, 90% supermarkets were located in these two cities, of which 65% were in HCMC. At this stage, the diffusion of modern retail formats gradually penetrated some secondary cities (Hai Phong, Da Nang, Can Tho, Dong Nai) in the period of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , then into smaller towns in the period of 2007-present. Table 11 captures the balance between city and secondary/small towns by the major international and domestic retailers in 2012.
Take in Table 11 As part of this diffusion to lower order cities and towns, the focus of the leading retailers' marketing messages and service strategies has correspondingly shifted. While the 'transition stage' saw both Minimart and Seiyu specifically target affluent expatriate consumers in main cities, the 'globalisation stage' has seen a broadening of their business strategies towards lower-income customers. Such a shift is partly expressed through the value-focused nature of business slogans (see Table 12 ). It is also notable that the marketing messages particularly underline the importance of families. We speculate that this may, in part, be indicative of the collectivist nature of Vietnamese society.
Take in Table 12 (iv) Diversification in store format
The research concerning the globalisation phase of retail expansion is characterised by an increasing diversification of store formats across competitive space. As Hu et al. (2004, p 566) suggests from a Chinese context: the predominant initial format was the small supermarket, followed by the introduction of large supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores and hypermarkets, the latter introduced in the late 1990s first by foreign and then by domestic chains.
Throughout the 'transition' and into the 'globalisation' periods, Vietnamese domestic retailers attempted to firm-up their competitive position prior to TNC entry when de-regulation loosened the restrictions on expansion. These domestic retailers not only focused on developing the supermarket format, but also cultivated new formats such as:
The By far the largest convenience store operator was G7Mart, founded by the owners of Trung Nguyen Coffee Company, which set about 'upgrading' existing grocery stores. G7 trained the owners/sellers, in the process applying information technology to coordinate the store systems and standardised the store signage (Saigon Times, no date). The units were then re-branded either G7Mart or as a G7 member store. Clearly, G7 Mart capitalised on the existing customer bases of 'mom and pop' stores but gained from better in-store standards, product ranges and service levels. By August 2006, G7 had opened 500 G7marts, 9,500 G7 member stores and 70 wholesale distribution centres. However, consumer acceptance of the retail format and recognition of the retail brand was mixed -an issue exacerbated by the separation of G7mart from its parent company, Coffee Trung Nguyen Company.
Consequently, many of the independent operators suspended their contracts with G7 Company and returned to independent status in 2008.
Therefore, while the market is not concentrated in ownership terms, the store format growth vehicles are increasingly large, western formats -as evident from Figure 7 , which notes the core formats of the top five grocery retailers within Vietnam.
Take in Figure 7 
Conclusions
While studies of retail internationalisation have tended to focus on fully liberalised countries that have attracted high rates of retail capital, we have focused on tracing retail change in a country that embraced and exhibited these trends somewhat later. By analysing the modernisation of the retail structure of Vietnam from a closed, socialist model to one that is increasingly open to retail TNC entry and associated Western retail formats, we have identified a number of issues and themes that have relevance across retail management and marketing, economic geography and development studies more widely.
As a country recently entering the third phase of retail transformation in a FSCE, we find that hypermarkets to under-developed retail markets remains a high risk undertaking (cf. Etgar and Rachman-Moore, 2007; Goldman and Krider, 1999; Goldman et al., 2002) .
Regulatory conditions failed to fully restrict retail TNCs with numerous examples of operators clearly flouting the laws or employing strategies for development at the margin of legality -such as Big C's apparent use of an "unofficial joint venture". Indeed, such retailer innovative responses to regulation to achieve growth are well-known (cf. Wood et al., 2010) . As Reardon et al. (2012, p 12334) 
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